Amicus brief: Expiration of a Personal Protection Order does not render an appeal moot.

The Michigan Supreme Court invited the public to submit amicus briefs to argue whether or not an appeal related to a personal protection order ("PPO") is rendered moot (that is, becomes pointless) if that personal protection order has expired. The hearing is scheduled for March 7, 2018. I am proud to announce that I submitted my Amicus Brief today (with the corresponding motion), supporting the position that expiration of a PPO does not justify the appellate court's dismissal of the appeal "as moot".  The background is given in the Application Brief and the appellant's Supplemental Brief.

Holding that expiration of a PPO justifies dismissing its related appeal(s) would only encourage harassment and corruption. That is because the backlog in Michigan Court Of Appeals is such that almost all PPOs expire by the time the appellate panel schedules the "review" of the case. Actual stalkers would benefit from an incorrect holding from the Michigan Supreme Court because they would be free to engage in stalking, knowing beforehand that their unlawful conduct will remain unpunished.

Another danger of dismissals as moot is that abusive petitioners of PPOs who are friends with the trial judge could obtain PPOs for the sake of unduly restraining others' rights. This would afford to corrupt individuals (including rotten judges and other elected officials) a quick and powerful tool for retaliation, or to silence a civilian whose denouncement of uncomfortable truths poses risks to their illicit dealings.

Iñaki Viggers

Justaguyguy and the blocking of guidance that could have helped him

Yesterday I ran into an inquiry submitted in early November of 2017 by a musician of username Justaguyguy from Nashville, TN. He states that, as a result of false and defamatory statements made about him, he lost a valuable spot in a rotation of performances. He points out that it took him significant effort to earn that spot. Being harmed in his reputation and in his profession, he asked for some guidance on whether or how to proceed.

How many replies has he gotten as of yesterday? Only two: One of them anticipating him to "be prepared to pay attorney fees" unless he finds an attorney open to work on contingency. The other one, posted by the forum Administrator, pointing out the rarity of working on a contingent basis (due to the complexity of defamation lawsuits). There's a little bit of additional information in those two replies, but definitely not enough for a starting point other than the typical "get an attorney".

Note: Because the Terms and Rules of that forum prohibit to display "their" content, I am playing safe by not publishing the screenshots I took now of that thread.

This musician's hardship resembles what I endured and which led to the lawsuits I filed in 2015. That unfortunate resemblance and the experience I have gotten as a pro se litigant prompted me to sign up in that forum and post my reply. I outlined some preliminary aspects to consider in case Justaguyguy decides to sue the person he refers to as the slanderer.

Because of my sympathy toward meritorious pro se litigants, I wish my videos and briefs would help them avoid the strategic and procedural mistakes that a novice litigant is prone to make. I directed Justaguyguy to the series Corrupted from Ed to Judge and the briefs I've filed in the Michigan Supreme Court. The former addresses what to watch out for during litigation; the latter reflect my most matured knowledge and handling of legal matters. I also directed him to , an invaluable, free resource for any litigant's research on USA case law.

In preparation for my reply to Justaguyguy's thread, I searched the Tennessee statutes. It surprised me that in Tennessee the statute of limitations for defamation lawsuits is six months only (Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-103), half of what it is in many other jurisdictions! His inquiry being made over two months ago, this means that Justguyguy has less than four months to prepare and commence legal action against whoever caused him unlawful damages.

Given the "rarity" (?) and complexity of defamation cases as depicted in the second reply of that thread, I thought that my informed advice would be welcome there. But no, it wasn't. Not everyone likes the forthcoming Do-It-Yourself alternative I promote in regard to litigation. Some so-called "moderator" of that forum banned me under the generic pretext of "spam". Since then I have asked the administrator to restore my profile and my posts, but to no avail. If you open that thread, you won't see any traces of my post.

The lawyers who own and set up a blog or forum have the right to manage it as they please. However, that style of forum "moderation" (aka banning) is misleading and quite unfortunate. People approach those forums when they feel lost and are in need for orientation. They approach those forums with the belief that they'll find well-intentioned guidance, something more useful than "consult an attorney", something above and beyond the sarcasms and trolling that abound in those sites. Many of those people don't even have enough resources to persuade an attorney to take their case. In these instances, a pro se litigant's sincere and informed advice wouldn't cause this handful of lawyers to lose business anyway.

It will be a shame if the banning of useful guidance prevents Justaguyguy from obtaining through Tennessee courts whatever remedies to which he is entitled.

Iñaki Viggers

Comments on "Rebooting Justice", a book authored by Barton and Bibas

I  saw a review of the book Rebooting Justice, by professors Benjamin Barton and Stephanos Bibas (henceforth "the Professors") . I did not read and do not plan to read the book, but I believe my litigation experience qualifies me to address some key points of the book as highlighted in the article by Mark Pulliam.

Quoting a reader of name gabe in the comments section of that blog, "it sounds like another 'Lawyer Full Employment Act' ". The reader as well as the author of that blog palpably disagree with the Professors' suggestion that funds for the defense of felony cases be increased to match the resources assigned to prosecution. I join them in their criticism. I dispute the Professors' position that the under-funding of public defenders and court-appointed counsel is a major issue. One just needs to look at all those represented parties who disburse fortunes to their lawyer only to realize that the lawyer was overly negligent.

The Professors' other suggestions such as "mediation alternatives" and "inquisitorial judges" are somehow already provided in the legislature and/or procedural law. Purist debates aside, where's the line between an inquisitorial system and the judge's OBLIGATION (in an adversarial system) to ascertain the truth? The sad reality is that many judges disavow that cornerstone obligation and other duties they acquired since the moment they are sworn.

Except for vexatious litigants, filing a complaint in court is not done out of boredom. By the time a complaint is filed in court, the plaintiff is persuaded that other mediation-like venues were futile or he justifiably believes that they will be so. Both mediation and negotiation are premised on mutual willingness to reach a solution, and in most situations the adversaries are free to negotiate on their own. Therefore, the Professors' suggestion of creating "mediation alternatives" means additional overhead to the disputes between parties.

Best case scenario is that a "mediation alternative" will do no harm other than delaying the course of justice. In reality, mediation "alternatives" sometimes end up being compulsory just because some judge arbitrarily came up with that "interpretation". By doing so, the arbitrary judge crafts an additional tool to deny justice under the pretext that the plaintiff "failed to exhaust administrative remedies". One example of this type of fraud by judges is discussed on pages 47-49 of my Application for Leave to Appeal pending in the Michigan Supreme Court, also explained at minute 36:55 in the 6th segment of my series Corrupted from Ed to Judge.

The Professors' proposal of "a court system designed for pro se litigants, with simplified procedures" is redundant, demagogic, and impractical. For example, what if one party is pro se but the opponent insists to be represented? In such instances, how will a judge balance between the long-standing procedural law and the "simplified procedures" that the Professors suggest? In other words, what will due process entail in those scenarios?

Current procedural law in one or more jurisdictions contains gaps and discrepancies that the jurisdiction's top court leaves unaddressed. One real-life example is developed on pages 38-41 of the Application for Leave to Appeal, regarding my other case pending in the Michigan Supreme Court. There, the Application Brief denounces (1) how judge Carol Kuhnke abused that gap in the Michigan Court Rules to enforce her miscarriage of justice (in doing so, judge Kuhnke repeatedly violated another Court Rule), and (2) how judge Mark Cavanagh and the appellate panel he presided looked the other way regarding that gap, inconsistent with judge Cavanagh's approach in an unrelated appeal (COA# 256051). With this sort of unsolved gaps in the existing procedural law, imagine the multitude of new loopholes that judges would exploit if a parallel court "for pro se litigants" is implemented.

Furthermore, how will case law be applied or adapted to the "simplified procedures"? will prima facie elements be different and also more useful in the simplified procedures? I doubt it. Courts will inevitably end up reinventing the wheel in many situations, thereby rendering the already slow judicial system even slower ... and perhaps more inconsistent.

People need to know that, whatever room there is for simplification of procedures, their best way to achieve them is by putting pressure on the legislators. After all, appellate and supreme courts repeatedly acknowledge (albeit often disavowing) that the judiciary must yield to the legislature. Of course, the negligent or rotten judge ignores his/her jus dire job and instead indulges in jus dare.

The only realistic solution to the judicial mess requires that people educate themselves on legal matters. Education does not necessarily involve enrollment in overpriced Law School programs. Nowadays, printed resources and the Internet greatly facilitate this essential element for when we are harmed by rotten individuals. Comparing that realistic, low-budget solution versus the gigantic funds required for the implementation of the new procedures and new courts hosting additional corruptible judges is a no-brainer.

Learning about legal matters is certainly boring. Moreover, it feels wasteful for us who have other intellectual interests. There is an undeniable cost of opportunity in having to study law just because many judges refuse to do their actual job. But knowledge is power, and there is simply no other long-term antidote to the undeniable corruption of the judiciary. The Professors are right in that the "legal" system is a cartel (I am adding the quotation marks), and I assure you that it will remain that way for as long as people continue to delegate any and all legal/judicial matters to "a lawyer".

The solution I promote places the victim in a better position to demand justice and to realize as well as denounce when a judge or attorney is defrauding him. That education is also likely to discourage wrongful conduct, since many potential offenders would think twice before engaging in unlawful or inequitable acts.

Iñaki Viggers

Presenting the complete series "Corrupted from Ed to Judge"

In nine segments, I present in video format the background and litigation experience which inspired my initiative One Club Of Justicides.

Because the defamatory publications by Maria Viggers need to be heavily redacted, I'll be updating and uploading those files in the corresponding section of this site as time permits.

Corrupted from Ed to Judge (Part 1 of 9): Shady, shady University of Michigan.
Background, because normal people don't happen to file proceedings in court just out of boredom.

Corrupted from Ed to Judge (Part 2 of 9): A fractal of court-endorse fraud.
Let me tell you a little story about a lawyer who attempted to commit fraud and got busted by me ... only to be rescued by his buddy judge ... yes, this is the "law" in Michigan.

The University of Michigan and Al-Azhar Pacha duck and cover upon my scrutiny because ... well, that's what scumbags do when they got something to hide.

Corrupted from Ed to Judge (Part 4 of 9): Directly relevant evidence? Now see the judge preclude it.
Mostly addressing my lawsuit against María Viggers, my father's second wife.

Covering the early stages of my lawsuit against Al-Azhar Pacha.

Corrupted from Ed to Judge (Part 6 of 9): judge Corrupt Kuhnke depicts Michigan as mafia.
This is the continuation of the fifth segment, as it covers the latter portion of my judicial proceedings against Al-Azhar Pacha in trial court. Also, judge Carol Kuhnke featuring the antithesis of candidate Carol Kuhnke.

Corrupted from Ed to Judge (Part 7 of 9): judge Carol Kuhnke is a disgrace to the judicial system.
Some interesting events took place during the backlog in the Michigan Court Of Appeals.
If you'd like to read further:

Corrupted from Ed to Judge (Part 8 of 9): MCOA, the Michigan Fraud Of Appeals.
The rubber stamping of judicial incompetence. Since that's all they got, that is an implicit acknowledgment that the judiciary ought to rule in my favor.

Corrupted from Ed to Judge (Part 9 of 9): Epilogue ... as of this point in time.
Not strictly an epilogue, since the matters are pending in the Michigan Supreme Court. Albeit a foreign concept to the "Fantastic Four" ... will the Michigan Supreme Court exercise integrity? Time will tell.

Bloopers occur in many series, and this was not the exception.

Latest briefs in my Application against Al Pacha in the Michigan Supreme Court

The attorneys representing defendant/appellee Al-Azhar Pacha have filed the Appelle's Brief and I submitted my Reply Brief. Despite using the extended deadline granted by the Michigan Supreme Court, his attorneys ended up doing copy/paste from motions they've been filing since trial court ... slacking till the last hour? panic attack? Goebbels' big lie theory? Who knows!

Comprising in 10 pages my refutation of vexatious, disproved allegations which Al Pacha's attorneys spread in 37 pages is hard, but I achieved it (for the most part).

It is funny that these attorneys' pretext in their motion for an extended deadline was the authorities I cited from other jurisidictions: "decisions from outside Michigan, requiring significant research".But now, as I pointed out in my Reply Brief, these attorneys in their brief ended up advancing the mediocre allegation that "foreign states' own iteration of defamation law [...] is not necessarily the same as that in Michigan". They didn't even try to explain what differences (if any) they "think" exist. That was hilarious. These attorneys must have realized that the appellate reviews from honest jurisdictions really don't help Al Pacha.

Another remark is these attorneys' reliance on various unpublished decisions (that is, appellate opinions that don't constitute legal precedent) to refute the arguments I support with opinions issued by the Michigan Supreme Court and other binding decisions by the Court Of Appeals.

Ignacio Viggers

Request for retraction of inaccurate post by Demorest Law Firm (Updated)

Now I just submitted to the following request for retraction regarding the lawsuit I filed against Al-Azhar Pacha.

Attorney Lisa Okasinski, Nezar Habhab and to whom it may concern:

I am the plaintiff in Viggers v. Pacha. I just read the post allegedly written by Nezar Habhab. Hereby I request you to retract the inaccuracies in your post. I do not blame you for the distorted and fraudulent "review" released by the Michigan Court Of Appeals, but your post confuses issues by unduly adding some false and misleading statements. Please be more responsible when you write about appellate decisions.

Your article falsely portrays that I "stated" that ALPAC's failure to sponsor me [for a greencard] "may result in some kind of revenge". That is not what I wrote (see page 2 of the COA's opinion). Your paraphrasing or juxtaposition of statements is substantially false and misleading. Moreover, from the entirety of my email to defendant  Al Pacha it is clear that my expression "some kind of revenge" refers my fear that defendant Al Pacha was retaliating for my decision to retain the University's offer of employment (see Exhibit B in my complaint against Al Pacha). Documents of this case are available at .

It is noteworthy that, during his deposition, defendant Al Pacha was embarrassingly unable to articulate his alleged interpretation of the proverb ("what goes around comes around") upon which he belatedly justified his false accusations. This is relevant to the matter of a defendant's state of mind (actual malice).

Also your clause of "Acting quickly to save face" is unduly prejudicial. For over three months, defendant Al Pacha as well as the nonparty University of Michigan incurred silent fraud as recently defined by the Michigan Supreme Court (see my Application for Leave to Appeal in the Michigan Supreme Court). Al Pacha's silent fraud constitutes circumstantial evidence that Al Pacha made his false and defamatory statements with actual malice ... I am sure that you are acquainted with the concept of a defendant's consciousness of guilt, which also constitutes a mental state.

In the brief I filed in the Michigan Supreme Court, I am pointing to multiple proofs (supported by the existing case law) I submitted as evidence of Al-Azhar Pacha's  actual malice at the time he made his false and defamatory statements. There, you will notice that I proved actual malice not only under the aspect of knowledge of falsity, or with a reckless disregard for the truth of the statements, but also under criteria including but not limited to: 
(1) Al Pacha's purposeful avoidance of the truth; 
(2) his refusal to retract statements that have been proved false; 
(3) his consciousness of guilt (see his aforementioned silent fraud); 
(4) his "entertaining serious doubts" regarding the "veracity" of his defamatory statements (Al Pacha waited twenty days before he urgently asked to meet with the University "as soon as possible"); and 
(5) Al Pacha's deliberate choice not to show the University employees the allegedly "threatening" emails upon which he fabricated his fraudulent stories.

To avoid repeating content, I encourage you to read my recent post from October 26, 2017, at, where I dismantle a number of inaccuracies of fact and of law that the Michigan Court Of Appeals incurred in its so-called "appellate review". That post is in response to an article by discussing the decision.

Please be aware that I am posting the instant request for retraction at because your potential clients and the public deserve to know whether or not members of Demorest Law Firm conduct themselves with honesty when their false statement(s) is (are) disproved.

Kind regards,

Ignacio Viggers

UPDATE on 10/31/2017 at 1:40 PM (EST)

Demorest Law Firm has corrected the inaccuracies I reported. Thank you attorney Mike Hayes for the follow-up.

Another article making inaccurate statements (Updated)

An unexpected consequence of the severe ineptitude from some judges in the Michigan Court Of Appeals is that law firms add inaccurate statements of their own when they "discuss" an opinion released by the court. Hereby I reproduce ('as is') the request and clarifications I submitted by email ( and to the attorneys who authored .

Attention attorneys Andrea Johnson and Nickolas Guttman:

This is a request for retraction and removal of your incorrect statements at on October 27, 2017, regarding my lawsuit against Al-Azhar Pacha. Your post contains important inaccuracies and it mischaracterizes other facts.

First and foremost, I didn't send defendant Al-Azhar Pacha "threatening emails". If you read the COA's opinion carefully, on its page 2 it states that "Pacha INTERPRETED the e-mails as direct threats" (uppercase added). Then on page 4 it states that "two emails from Viggers that [Al Pacha] PERCEIVED as a threat" (uppercase added). A defendant's ALLEGATION IN COURT that he "perceived" or "interpreted" something as a threat doesn't mean that the plaintiff sent any threats. Your post, however, falsely asserts the latter. You as attorneys are expected to be more careful with this type of details.

Your post mischaracterizes issues by stating that I "did not tell Pacha or ALPAC about the job offer for months". That statement unduly portrays me as acting in a shady way toward the defendant. This is disproved by the fact that, before I applied for the University's position, defendant Al Pacha allowed me to apply for that position after the [client] University of Michigan persuaded him. See page 1 of the COA's opinion. For relevance and brevity, I won't even elaborate on Al Pacha's history of not getting back (sometimes "for months") to his employee(s) in a timely manner when it relates to the employee's concerns.

The advice given by Al Pacha's attorney (regarding sponsorship for green card) is wrong and outdated. I directed Al Pacha's attention to a recent ruling by the USCIS Administrative Appeals Office that debunks his attorney's advice, but Al Pacha deliberately ignored the information I provided to him. Instead, Al Pacha used (and distorted!) his attorney's wrong advice as context for his false and defamatory accusations. Thus, defendant Al Pacha incurred purposeful avoidance of the truth (and juxtaposition of facts), which courts recognize as proof(s) of actual malice. I addressed this in my briefs, although the COA was too negligent to consider this important aspect of the legal context in this matter.

To avoid duplication of content, I encourage you to read at my other recent posts regarding Al Pacha's actual malice, in response to articles elsewhere discussing the COA's opinion. In my brief to the Michigan Supreme Court (available at ) I address several other matters of fact and of law which the COA fraudulently ignored and distorted. I'm aware that you are not liable for the COA's inaccuracies in its so-called "appellate review", but you ought to refrain from "contributing" additional errors when you write about appellate opinions.

Please be aware that I am also posting the instant request [for retraction and removal] at . Your potential clients and the public deserve to know whether or not you conduct yourselves with honesty after false statement of your own have been disproved.

Kind regards,

Ignacio Viggers

UPDATE on 10/31/2017, 1:29 PM (EST)

Credit where credit is due, attorneys Andrea Johnson and Nickolas Guttman are the first ones to reconsider and make the right decision regarding my denouncement and request. Thank you attorneys Andrea Johnson and Nickolas Guttman.

The virtue of reconsideration is one item clients need to factor when choosing which law firm to retain. Al-Azhar Pacha should have retained lawyers who have the wisdom (like these two attorneys from Zac Firm) that could discourage him from getting in trouble, instead of Al Pacha cornering himself upon his attorneys' advice to essentially keep doubling down.

All other publishers (employers or otherwise) need to understand that false and defamatory statements regarding one's profession are defamatory per se, meaning that no damages need to be proved at all in order to obtain recovery in court. The Michigan Supreme Court recently made to the Court Of Appeals a reminder of that principle: Lakin v. Rund 318 Mich.App. 127; 896 N.W.2d 76, 80 (2016) (citing Mains v. Whiting, 87 Mich. 172, 180; 49 N.W. 559 (1891)). However, the Michigan Court Of Appeals quickly ignored this again, as is reflected in the opinion it released regarding my case.

Michigan is not the only jurisdiction with this principle. My brief in the Michigan Supreme Court (pages 14-16 of my Application for Leave to Appeal) cites legal (and current) precedent from other states/jurisdictions in this regard:
- Torosyan v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 234 Conn. 1, 35 (1995).
- Smith v. Francesco, A170404, Court Of Appeals of Georgia (published June 19,  2017).

Do not be fooled by the appellate panel's severely flawed "review" of my case against Al-Azhar Pacha.

Response/comment to article

I became aware of a recent article at regarding the lawsuit I filed against Al-Azhar Pacha and which currently is in the Michigan Supreme Court. The article states that I could not be reached for comment, although in reality I was not approached. I just posted my comment, which has been submitted for review. I trust the site will be impartial and post my comment. Regardless, hereby I reproduce beforehand my comment 'as is':


I am the plaintiff/appellant in this lawsuit. I was never approached for comment on this topic, but I will be happy to dismantle some of the egregious inaccuracies authored by the Michigan Court Of Appeals (and of course, by defendant Al-Azhar Pacha).

Neither my communications to Al Pacha contained any threats whatsoever nor is it true that Al Pacha "interpreted" my communications as such. The opinion released by the Michigan Court Of Appeals is replete with errors of law and distortion of the facts.

Case law explains that the qualified privilege is premised on moral and social obligations. The privilege is not intended for advancing a defendant's pecuniary ambitions. The typical scenario where qualified privilege is applied is that where the publisher of defamatory statements does not have any business ambitions regarding the prospective employer. When a defendant has business ambitions on the entity to which the publication is made, the qualified privilege is stricken. See 360 Construction Co. Inc. v. Atsalis, 915 F.Supp.2d, 883, 897, 899 (E.D. Mich. 2012). In my lawsuit, the courts unduly ignored Al Pacha's incentive to defame me: At the same meeting where Al Pacha calumniated me, he offered the client/university to provide it with a replacement who would perform the functions for which the university had made me the offer of employment.

The Court Of Appeals unduly trivialized matters for the sake of perpetuating Al Pacha's unlawful conduct. An elaboration of the facts and legal context is essential in order to realize the blatant fraud committed by the Court Of Appeals. As the saying goes, "the devil is in the details". The public is welcome and strongly encouraged to read the latest briefs of the case as well as the transcript of Al Pacha's deposition testimony. These files are available at Other records of the case are available upon request.

Unfortunately, not all offenses of defamation by an employer can be averted by the employee's count to 10. Some rotten employers resort to defamation unjustifiably, and that was the situation here.

My lawsuit against Al Pacha is strikingly similar to Mareck v. Johns Hopkins University, 60 Md.App. 217 (1984); 482 A.2d 17. In Mareck, after failed negotiations between the parties, co-defendant Galambos defamed Mareck by allegedly "interpreting" Mareck's statement "as a hostile threat [...] with a clear negative thrust". Al Pacha went beyond that by falsely imputing to me specific statements of threat without even framing his narrative as "interpretation".

I praise the Maryland Court of Special Appeals for its integrity in its comprehensive review of a case that presents overwhelming analogies with mine. By contrast, here the Michigan Court Of Appeals distorted and omitted crucial facts while also ignoring the applicable law. The Michigan Court Of Appeals rendered the Michigan judicial system embarrassingly subpar to that of Maryland and several other jurisdictions I cite in my brief in the Michigan Supreme Court. The opinion released by the Michigan Court Of Appeals is a textbook case of judicial fraud.

The Michigan legislature enacted in MCL 423.452 all the conditions that an employer has to meet in order to be immune from civil liability for his defamatory disclosure. The Michigan Supreme Court has made it clear that when the legislation prescribes in detail the conditions, parties, things affected, specific limitations, and exceptions, that statute in the legislature supersedes its common-law counterpart (source: Hoerstman Gen Contracting, Inc. v. Hahn, 474 Mich. 66, 74; 711 N.W.2d 340 (2006), cited on page 17 of my brief in the Michigan Supreme Court). MCL 423.452 is more recent, much more specific, and detailed than the blurry and incomplete elements of common-law "qualified privilege".

Here, Al Pacha violated the vast majority or all of the conditions in MCL 423.452 when he made his defamatory statements. For obvious reasons, Al Pacha's attorneys dislike the application of MCL 423.452 in this lawsuit. However, counsel Brouwer was utterly unable to articulate in her appellate brief how being:
"immune from liability under the common-law qualified privilege defense to claims of defamation and tortious interference" (Al Pacha's Appellee's Brief, page 27, in the Court Of Appeals)
is any different from the enactment in MCL 423.452 of being:
"[conditionally] immune from civil liability for the disclosure".

Whether under MCL 423.452 or under a common-law qualified privilege, one key issue is whether the defamer genuinely believed the communications he or she uttered; not what the judges' personal interpretation thereof is. Courts are tasked with assessing circumstantial evidence to ascertain the defendant's mental state at the time he or she made the defamatory statements: if evidence supports a finding "actual malice", the privilege or immunity is void. Here, the Court Of Appeals impermissibly ignored a multitude of inconsistencies and fraudulent acts that Al Pacha incurred during his unlawful acts and thereafter.

As explained above, courts strike a qualified privilege when the defamer is motivated by pecuniary interests or other ulterior motives. Here, Al Pacha met with the university to calumniate me and simultaneously he offered the university to provide it with a replacement for what the university selected me. Thus, it is noteworthy that Al Pacha could not even dissimulate his ulterior motive: a continued profit from the university's funds.

Unlike the Mareck court, here the Court Of Appeals neglected to assess the context with seriousness.

My dissatisfaction with Al Pacha was not because of how the green card process "was being handled". It was because Al Pacha demanded conditions which were unreasonable, given his being erratic, dilatory, and deliberately ignorant during the "green card" negotiations. Had Al Pacha had to deal with an uncooperative employer like him back when he was not yet an immigrant, today he would be stuck in his native India. The irony of Al Pacha's vexatious conduct prompted my mention of the proverb "what goes around comes around".

Al Pacha made no reference whatsoever to the proverb "what goes around comes around" when he spoke to the university employees. Instead, Al Pacha uttered false statements of fact to portray me as a person willing to violate one of the university's guidelines regarding the university's vendor contracts decision-making. A review of my emails demonstrates that Al Pacha made his defamatory statements with actual malice, for he knew that his narrative to the university was false.

Another circumstantial aspect that proves actual malice is what courts call "[the defendant's] purposeful avoidance of the truth". It is inaccurate for Al Pacha and the Court Of Appeals to portray as mutually exclusive my two options (H-1B with the university and green card with Al Pacha). During the "green card" negotiations in 2015, I directed Al Pacha's attention to a recent decision by the USCIS Administrative Appeals Office. The AAO's decision states that a professional is eligible for a "green card" regardless of the number of offers of employment he or she retains and even if each of those offers of employment is from different employers. Instead of considering the AAO's decision -or at least forwarding the URL link to his attorney for validation purposes-, Al Pacha hung from his attorney's wrong or outdated advice as "legal ground" for his false accusations with the university. Because the true and updated information was readily available to Al Pacha and he deliberately ignored that information, Al Pacha purposefully avoided the truth so that he could build upon his fallacious "legal" context the false accusations he made. The Court Of Appeals turned a blind eye to Al Pacha's purposeful avoidance of the truth.

Al Pacha always knew of -and admitted in writing- my impeccable ethics, and therefore he could not genuinely "interpret" my emails in year 2015 as "direct threats". My frustration (or what Al Pacha calls "disgruntlement") prompted me to send him one or more emails in year 2011 with a similar tone of my two emails in 2015. Al Pacha didn't interpret the email(s) from 2011 as "threatening". The fact is that a year later it was me, not him, who decided to end the employment relationship. Back then, I didn't commit any "act for which ALPAC may be held liable". Not back then, and not ever during my  employment with Al Pacha. The fact is that six months later I was rehired by him upon request by the university.

Why would Al Pacha falsely accuse me in 2015 of "threatening" him? Because Al Pacha in 2015 was unable to lure me into declining my prospective position at the client/university (the aforementioned failed negotiations), whence Al Pacha's only option consisted of defaming me for the sake of preserving his source of revenue from the university.

Al Pacha did not even express to the university his alleged "concern" that I "may sabotage the university's systems". Al Pacha's belated "sabotage" argument is what his lawyers spoon-fed him in preparation for his overdue deposition. However, there is no actual evidence of him having or expressing to the university his alleged "concern". Regardless, it is inept and disingenuous for Al Pacha to speculate or "fear" that I would risk my prospective employment at the university (by sabotaging the university's systems) so that this unimportant intermediary could be held liable to my prospective employer.

It is false that Al Pacha "explained" me on July 30, 2015, that the termination was because of his "fear" that I "would to something to do harm his business with the university". Al Pacha barely mentioned "the string of emails" and the proverb "what goes around comes around" on July 30. That was all his explanation. Moreover, while terminating me, Al Pacha called the university to announce my termination "effective immediately". During the phone call, Al Pacha made comments falsely suggesting that his decision was made impromptu. That was Al Pacha's theatrical stunt to prevent me from discovering that in the prior days he had made defamatory statements and subsequent arrangements with the University of Michigan. Al Pacha's theatrical stunt reflects his consciousness of guilt, which constitutes additional proof of Al Pacha's actual malice.

It took me over three months to discover that Al Pacha had defamed me. Then in court, Al Pacha avoided his deposition for three months. When I was finally allowed to take his deposition, I gave Al Pacha several opportunities to articulate his alleged "interpretation" of the proverb "what goes around comes around", as this was his belated pretext for his defamatory statements. Al Pacha's answers regarding his "interpretation" were: "I don't recall", "I don't know", "[I] explain it to a kid at the age that the kid can understand and comprehend that phrase", "Right now I don't have a kid here so I don't know", and "You are not a kid". These incompetent answers disprove counsel Brouwer's allegation that Al Pacha waited 20 days because "he wanted to make a thoughtful decision".

Apropos of Al Pacha's delay of 20 days, Al Pacha uttered his false and defamatory statements within six hours of Law Enforcement serving upon my stepmother, María Viggers, the Personal Protection Order I requested against her.
The stepmother María Viggers had been harassing and threatening the university employees since March of 2015 in her attempt to sabotage my employment. María Viggers' course of conduct prompted the university to indefinitely suspend in April of 2015 my process for H-1B visa sponsorship and therefore my hire process. While calumniating me with the university, María Viggers insisted to gather from the university who my direct employer Al Pacha) was.

The stepmother María Viggers has a notorious history of violating restraining orders and interfering with others' employment. It is very possible that right after receiving the Personal Protection Order (1) María Viggers may have contacted my employer, and/or (2) María Viggers may contacted the university, thereby prompting arrangements between the university and Al Pacha for a cover up of the situation to make it look like an employer-employee conflict. It would be otherwise unflattering for the university to admit that it severs its relations with a central victim (me) of harassment as opposed to reporting the harasser, María Viggers, for violation of the Personal Protection Order against her.

The strange coincidence in the timing of the events (six hours) outweighs Al Pacha's pretext for waiting 20 days (the "thoughtful decision"), more so given his omission of the proverb when speaking with the university and his subsequent inability to articulate his interpretation of the proverb. The University of Michigan has not been forthcoming in my lawsuit against María Viggers either: the University of Michigan repeatedly made fraudulent statements; produced perjurious and/or amnesic witnesses; produced many blank and heavily redacted pages to hide crucial evidence; and disavowed a court ruling that authorized me to take the deposition testimony of a central witness whom the university terminated few months later. Also in the lawsuit against María Viggers, the Michigan Court Of Appeals resorted to a variety of severely flawed excuses to deprive me of justice.

A defamer's refusal to retract defamatory statements that have been proved false constitutes proof of actual malice. All the university employees at deposition testified that Al Pacha attributed to me an elaborated statement of threat. The university employees consistently testified to those same details. The statement of threat that Al Pacha attributed to me during that meeting is objectively verifiable as false.

During Al Pacha's deposition, I asked him to confirm whether he made that statement. Al Pacha's answer was "Not that I recollect". Hence, it is inexplicable why at all times Al Pacha has been refusing to retract that statement despite my requests therefor. Here, not only the Court Of Appeals ignored Al Pacha's inexplicable refusal as proof of actual malice, but the Michigan courts have been disavowing their moral duty to protect the good name of law-abiding civilians.

Proof of actual malice is also inextricably linked to the concept of fraud. The Michigan Supreme Court in Bank of Am. v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 499 Mich. 74, 878 N.W.2d 816 (2016), defined "silent fraud" as the suppression of facts "where circumstances establish a legal duty to make full disclosure. Such a duty of full disclosure may arise when a party has expressed to another some particularized concern or made a direct inquiry". When I made a direct, particularized inquiry to Al Pacha (few days prior to discovering his defamatory statements), Al Pacha concealed from me a number of interactions he had with the university in preparation for terminating me.

The Court Of Appeals simply took dictation of the unsupported allegations Al Pacha's attorneys made in court. That sort of secretarial job by the Court Of Appeals falls short of being an actual "appellate review". By ignoring so much evidence, the Court Of Appeals and the trial court ended up treating a qualified privilege as an absolute one.

An interesting fact is that few minutes before the trial court closed my lawsuit, the presiding judge Carol Kuhnke lectured me that Michigan loves employers "and anybody who's powerful, okay? [...] if you're not in those groups, then you just kinda have to try and stay out the way" (hearing transcript of August 17, 2016, page 21, lines 7-12). Judge Carol Kuhnke made her impudent remark four months after she denied my motion for recusal.

Judge Carol Kuhnke's rogue expression on the bench is the extreme opposite of the "equal protection of the laws" enacted in Article I.2 of the Michigan Constitution. Judges with this aberrant mindset are morally unable to recognize when a qualified privilege has been abused.

The judges incurred several other irregularities in my lawsuit. For brevity, in this comment I am only addressing some of the items discussed in this article.

The points presented here illustrate (1) the extent to which some courts suppress Michigan laws and the evidenced facts so that those courts accommodate a perpetrator's unlawful conduct, and (2) the importance that everybody be acquainted with the laws so as to pinpoint when the judiciary indulges in flagrant fraud.

My litigation experience in Michigan courts leaves me wondering how many seemingly "trivial" cases are in fact grossly mischaracterized by certain appellate panels.

Alfonso Ignacio Viggers

Reverse Engineering

Here I'll be posting my analyses in reverse engineering for the x86 architecture. demonstrates the technique of Buffer Overflow Exploits applied to a crackme.

In I finally made good on my promise to illustrate my analysis of this crackme, which I solved shortly after it was posted. Due to its origin, the analysis is drafted in German. Screens are in assembly language and hexadecimal, though.